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“FOR THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS”: A COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF THE
CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND AUSTRALIA

James Grant Semonin*
What is striking me about [efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege is that
legislators are] now going beyond public institutions and reaching very deeply
into the interior life of the Church—how we manage our sacramental life—and
that kind of aggression, that sort of violation of religious liberty . . . should
concern not just Catholics but anyone who is committed to . . . political values.1

INTRODUCTION
The clergy-penitent privilege2 is a long-recognized rule of evidence which
protects from judicial inquiry evidence of confidential communications between
penitents and their clerics.3 It “recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”4 While
testimonial privileges are generally disfavored, the clergy-penitent privilege is “a
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2022. I would like to thank Professor
Richard Garnett and the editors of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their guidance, comments, and
assistance regarding the production of this Note.
1
Bishop Robert Barron, Bishop Barron on California’s Attack on Confession, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfwrf7zhOT0; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, ¶¶ 1441, 1446
(noting Church teaching that only God forgives sins, but because “Christ entrusted to his apostles the ministry
of reconciliation, bishops who are their successors, and priests, the bishops’ collaborators, continue to exercise
this ministry”). It is therefore through the sacrament of Holy Orders that bishops and priests are enabled to
forgive sins “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.” Id. ¶ 1461.
2
For the purposes of this Note, I use the term “clergy-penitent privilege,” primarily because the privilege
is not limited to a particular religion or denomination. See e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 505. It is important to note,
however, that the term used to describe the privilege varies among scholars and jurisdictions. See e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027,
1030 n.* (N.Y. 2001) (noting that prior cases in the same jurisdiction have referred to the privilege using
different terms including “priest-penitent” privilege, “clergy-penitent” privilege, “minister-penitent” privilege,
“cleric-congregant” privilege, and “clergy-communicant” privilege) (citations omitted).
3
Ronald J. Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 225 (1998).
4
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
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public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining the truth.”5 The privilege has been recognized since as early
as the fifth century, with its origins in the Catholic sacrament of Penance, as codified
in the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church.6 While the privilege is not limited
to Catholic priests,7 this Note focuses on the Catholic Church specifically. This is
due in part to the fact that the privilege is well-exemplified in the context of disputes
regarding criminal conduct disclosed during a sacramental confession and also
because the debate surrounding the privilege has become increasingly contentious in
the wake of the child sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic Church.8 In response to
this scandal, many state legislatures across the United States passed statutes making
clerics mandatory reporters of child abuse, though not every state has done so.9 There
were similarly strong responses in Australia as well, where, in 2012, then-Prime
Minister, Julia Gillard, announced her decision to establish a Royal Commission to
investigate institutional responses to child sexual abuse and to make
recommendations regarding the states’ mandatory reporter laws.10
At the federal level of the United States, proposals to adopt a formal rule of
evidence regarding the clergy-penitent privilege have been rejected by Congress.11
Nevertheless, its inclusion in the proposed rules has been deemed to support the
notion that it has been “indelibly ensconced” in the American legal system.12 This is
evidenced by the fact that, unlike the federal government, today, every state has
enacted some form of the clergy-penitent privilege.13 However, each state differs in
terms of how the privilege is defined, what communications are covered, and who
may assert it.14 At the same time, every state has mandatory reporter statutes which
require certain individuals to report known or suspected instances of child abuse and
neglect.15 In this regard, states also differ as to whether clergy are enumerated as
mandatory reporters and, if so, whether the privilege trumps the mandatory reporter
5

Id. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
Michael J. Mazza, Comment, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171,
186 (1998).
7
Clergy-Penitent Privilege, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW (2021) (defining the clergy-penitent
privilege as including a “priest, minister, rabbi, or similar figure of a religious organization”).
8
Elizabeth Mehren, Scandal Shaking Catholicism to Core, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2002),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-mar-13-mn-32586-story.html; see also Laurie Goodstein &
Sharon Otterman, Catholic Priests Abused 1,000 Children in Pennsylvania, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/catholic-church-sex-abuse-pennsylvania.html.
9
Paul Winters, Comment, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests of at-Risk Children in Conflict
with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 189 (2012); see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
CLERGY
AS
MANDATORY
REPORTERS
OF
CHILD
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
(2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/clergymandated.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY I].
10
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, ROYAL COMM’NS,
https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/royal-commission-institutional-responses-child-sexual-abuse (last visited
Sept. 10, 2020).
11
FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (proposed 1973).
12
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360, 368 (1980)).
13
Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007).
14
F. Robert Radel, II & Andrew A. Labbe, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege: An Overview, GROELLE &
SALMON, P.A., https://www.gspalaw.com/the-clergy-penitent-privilege-an-overview/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2020).
15
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY II].
6
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status or vice versa.16 Between 2019 and 2021 alone, California, Utah, and North
Dakota have been among states who have attempted to subordinate the privilege
regarding its conflict with mandatory reporter statutes.17 At the international level,
the same issues are being addressed in Australia, where state legislatures have become
increasingly active in efforts to curb the privilege. In 2020 alone, several of the eight
Australian states passed legislation requiring clergy to report instances of child abuse
revealed during a sacramental confession.18
These legislative developments have brought renewed interest to the clergypenitent privilege and its underpinnings. On the one hand, it is indisputable that
governments maintain a legitimate interest in curbing child abuse, and that abuse by
clergy is a problem at both the national and international levels.19 On the other hand,
both the United States and Australia recognize the essential right to the free exercise
of religion.20 Indeed, it has been said that freedom of religion is among the earliest
and most enduring human rights to be recognized internationally.21 Therefore, its
import in these matters of individual exercise and church governance cannot be
understated.
In the Catholic context, priests may be held accountable under state law
mandatory reporter requirements and the canon law of the Catholic Church, which
makes clear that “the sacramental seal is inviolable.”22 Under the canon law, a priest
who betrays the confidentiality of penitential communications made during a
sacramental confession faces immediate excommunication from the Catholic
Church.23 Therefore, the clergy-penitent privilege brings two competing interests to
the fore, namely, the state’s legitimate interest in obtaining evidence against
suspected child abusers and the right of the individual, both cleric and penitent alike,
to freely exercise their religion.24
This Note argues that recent national and international legislative efforts to
curb the clergy-penitent privilege have failed to adequately account for the right to
the free exercise of religion. Thus, this Note echoes the notion that a uniform
approach which both properly limits the scope of the privilege while maintaining due
deference for legitimate religious belief and practice is necessary. Part I of this Note
discusses the purpose, history, and structure of the clergy-penitent privilege generally,
its historical treatment in the United States and Australia, and its relation to religious
freedom embodied in the United States and Australian Constitutions. Part II discusses
how the privilege has been treated in the modern era, including the most recent
16

CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY I, supra note 9.
See S.B. 360, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see also H.B. 90, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2020);
S.B. 2180, 67th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021).
18
Western Australian Legislative Committee Recommends Preserving Confessional Seal, CATH. NEWS
AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/western-australian-legislativecommittee-recommends-preserving-confessional-seal-99410.
19
Nicole Winfield, A Global Look at the Catholic Church’s Sex Abuse Problem, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb.
21, 2019), https://apnews.com/8cb4daf509464bad8c13ef35d44a0fc5.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Australian Constitution s 116.
21
ANTHONY GRAY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND SECTION 116 OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: WOULD
A BANNING OF THE HIJAB OR BURQA BE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?, 2011 F. ON PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2011),
https://forumonpublicpolicy.com/vol2011.no2/archivevol2011.no2/gray.pdf.
22
1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
23
1983 CODE c.1388, § 1; see also Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030, 1037 (La. 2016).
24
See Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes: Let Free
Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 397 (1987).
17
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legislative efforts to alter the privilege concerning its relation to mandatory reporter
laws in the United States and Australia. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of
recent legislative efforts in the United States and Australia with an eye towards the
substantial burden these developments have imposed concerning matters of church
governance as well as the individual exercise of clerics and penitents alike. Part IV
then discusses a proposal for a more uniform approach to the clergy-penitent privilege
that keeps mandatory reporter requirements incumbent upon clergy by limiting the
scope of the privilege while also ensuring that such mandates will not infringe upon
legitimate religious beliefs and practices protected by the United States and
Australian Constitutions.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. EARLY CHURCH ORIGINS OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE AND THE
COMPANION CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
In the Catholic Church, the sacrament of Penance is among the seven
sacraments which are central pillars of the faith today.25 However, it is critical to note
that the sacrament is not a modern phenomenon. Indeed, confession has been a part
of the Christian religious tradition throughout history and reference to the Holy Bible
evidences its significance.26 Jesus Christ proclaimed to his Apostles that, “[i]f you
forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are
retained.”27 In Catholic theology, this apostolic authority conferred by Christ
succeeds the Apostles and has been passed down to the early church fathers as well
as the priests and bishops of the Church today.28 Between the third and fifth centuries,
the paramount importance of confidentiality concerning penitential communications
began to take hold.29 Indeed, Theodore of Mopsuestia, a fifth-century theologian and
bishop, said:
It behooves us, therefore, to draw near to the priests in great confidence and to
reveal to them our sins; and those priests, with all diligence, solicitude, and love,
and in accord with the regulations . . . will grant healing to sinners. [The priests]
25
See CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1210 (listing the seven sacraments of the
Catholic Church, including Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, the Anointing of the Sick, Holy
Orders, and Matrimony).
26
See, e.g., JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY
COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 41–42 (3d ed. 1989) (referencing biblical origins of confession in the New
Testament); see also 1 John 1:9 (“If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and
purify us from all unrighteousness.”); John 20:21–23 (“If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you
retain the sins of any, they are retained.”); Numbers 5:5–7 (“The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the
Israelites—When a man or woman wrongs another, breaking faith with the Lord, that person incurs guilt and
shall confess the sin that has been committed. The person shall make full restitution for the wrong, adding one
fifth to it, and giving it to the one who was wronged.”).
27
Robert John Araujo, S.J., International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: The Case for Respecting and
Preserving the “Priest-Penitent Privilege” Under International Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 639, 643 (2000)
(citing John 20:23).
28
What the Early Church Believed: Apostolic Succession, CATH. ANSWERS (Aug. 10, 2004),
https://www.catholic.com/tract/apostolic-succession.
29
Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 643.
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will not disclose the things that ought not to be disclosed; rather, they will be
silent about the things that have happened, as befits true and loving fathers who
are bound to guard the shame of their children while striving to heal their
bodies.30

Likewise, Pope St. Leo I, Bishop of Rome from 440 to 461, recommended
that penitential communications take place in private and directed priests to refrain
from publicly revealing penitents’ sins.31 By the end of the ninth century, the pope
promulgated an order aimed at codifying these directives, and in 1215, after the
Fourth Lateran Council convened, the Church adopted the absolute obligation of
secrecy regarding penitential communications, otherwise known as the seal of
confession.32 This obligation was later affirmed by the Council of Trent in 1551.33
The importance of secrecy in the context of penitential communications lays the
foundation upon which the sacramental confession and its accompanying clergypenitent privilege arise.
Inextricably related to confession, the clergy-penitent privilege derives from
pre-Reformation Europe and the canon law of the Catholic Church.34 Under the
canon law, Catholics are to confess their sins to a priest in what is known as the formal
sacrament of Penance.35 Specifically, the canon law provides that, “[a] member of
the Christian faithful is obliged to confess in kind and number all grave sins
committed after baptism ….”36 If a penitent wishes “to receive the salvific remedy
of the sacrament of penance,” then he must reject his sins and approach the sacrament
with a “purpose of amendment.”37 Many criminal acts, including the sexual assault
of children, constitute grave sins that must be confessed.38
The priest is tasked with administering the sacrament as “a minister of divine
justice and mercy . . . .”39 Therefore, upon hearing a penitent’s confession, the priest
imposes “salutary and suitable penances in accord with the quality and number of
sins, taking into account the condition of the penitent,” which the penitent must then
fulfill.40 It is a traditional form of penance for the penitent to be asked to spend time
in prayer. Still, other tangible forms of penance, such as directives to visit sacred
spaces, fast for a period of time, return stolen goods, restore another’s reputation, or

30
Mazza, supra note 6, at 174 n.20 (quoting WILLIAM A. JURGENS, THE FAITH OF THE EARLY FATHERS
83–84 (1979)).
31
Id. (citing JURGENS, supra note 30, at 272–73).
32
Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 645.
33
Id.
34
Lori Lee Brocker, Sacred Secrets: The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Finds its Way into the News, 57 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 15 (Oct. 1996).
35
Id. For the purposes of this Note, I refer to the sacrament as “Penance.” However, it is important to
note that while this is perhaps the most formal term, the sacrament is also referred to as the sacrament of
“reconciliation,” “confession,” “forgiveness,” and “conversion.” CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra
note 1, ¶ 1423–24.
36
1983 CODE c.988, §§ 1–2.
37
1983 CODE c.987.
38
Anthony Fisher, Let’s Be Clear: Sexual Abuse Is a Crime and a Grave Sin, W. ADVOC. (Dec. 17, 2019,
3:00 PM), https://www.westernadvocate.com.au/story/6547773/letter-lets-be-clear-sexual-abuse-is-a-crimeand-a-grave-sin/.
39
1983 CODE c.978, § 1.
40
1983 CODE c.981.
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pay compensation may be appropriate in some circumstances.41 At the conclusion of
the sacramental confession, the priest recites the prayer of absolution:
God, the Father of mercies,
through the death and resurrection of his Son
has reconciled the world to himself
and sent the Holy Spirit among us
for the forgiveness of sins;
through the ministry of the Church
may God give you pardon and peace,
and I absolve you of your sins in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of
the Holy Spirit.42

The Church teaches that “[t]he effect of this sacrament is deliverance from sin,” and
“reconciliation with God . . . .”43 In this regard, it is significant that, in Catholic
theology, penitential communications involve the confession of sins to the priest, who
stands in persona Christi—to communicate a pardon which God alone can give.44 In
this light, confession is “not so much an encounter with the priest. It is an encounter
with Christ through the sacramental mediation of the priest.”45 Thus, “the priest has
no mortal remembrance of what has been confessed, but rather possesses knowledge
meant solely for God’s ears.”46
It is in the context of this sacramental framework that the clergy-penitent
privilege first arose. The canon law provides that “[t]he sacramental seal is
inviolable,” and that “it is absolutely forbidden for a [priest] to betray in any way a
penitent in words or in any manner and for any reason.”47 Furthermore, “[a priest] is
prohibited completely from using knowledge acquired from confession to the
detriment of the penitent even when any danger of revelation is excluded.”48 If a
priest divulges the contents of a penitential communication, then he faces immediate
excommunication from the Catholic Church.49 Therefore, laws aimed at limiting the
availability of the clergy-penitent privilege place clerics in a position wherein they
must choose between allegiance to government law or divine law. The prevailing
sentiment among clergy in the Church is that “[p]riests will . . . suffer punishment,
even martyrdom, rather than break the seal of confession.”50 As discussed further
infra Part III.A, scholars have rightly argued that legislation which permits clergy to
41
Edward McNamara, Appropriate Penances, ETERNAL WORD TELEVISION NETWORK (EWTN) (Sept. 2,
2008), https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/appropriate-penances-4438; see also CATECHISM OF THE
CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1459.
42
CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1449.
43
Edward J. Hanna, Penance, CATH. ANSWERS, https://www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/penance (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020).
44
POPE ST. JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION “RECONCILIATO ET PAENITENTIA” (1984).
45
Barron, supra note 1.
46
Anthony Merlino, Comment, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional from
Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655, 746–47 (2002).
47
1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
48
1983 CODE c.984, § 1.
49
1983 CODE c.1388, § 1; see also Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030, 1037 (La. 2016).
50
Rob Taylor & Francis X. Rocca, New Laws Require Priests to Break the ‘Seal of Confession,’ WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2018, 9:37 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-laws-require-priests-to-break-the-seal-ofconfession-1533303462.
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be faced with such a dichotomy likely constitutes an infringement of the individual
right to the free exercise of religion.51
B. THE RISE OF THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE: FROM ROME TO ENGLAND
Before the Reformation, Roman Catholicism was the national religion of
England. The laws of England and the dictates of the Catholic faith were closely
intertwined because priests and bishops staffed the English courts.52 Scholars have
surmised that it is probably for this reason that the rulers of England respected the
sacrament of Penance and did not interfere with the seal of confession.53 Thus, it has
been said that the clergy-penitent privilege was adopted into English common law
from the canon law, though there is some disagreement among scholars as to the
degree to which this was true.54 Nevertheless, the privilege did not only garner
support from the religious but from secularists as well. Indeed, English jurist and
utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham recognized the social utility in maintaining
the clergy-penitent privilege, including the various restorative and therapeutic
benefits of guaranteeing the confidentiality of penitential communications.55
Although he was an atheist, Bentham displayed a concern for religious liberty and
wrote in the early nineteenth century that if a cleric were subject to testify regarding
the contents of penitential communications, then “it would become a matter of course
for the plaintiff or prosecutor . . . to summon [the priest] to appear as a witness. A
regulation to any such effect would therefore be a virtual proscription of the exercise
of the Catholic religion.”56
Despite this historical background, the privilege was not generally
recognized following the Reformation.57 Indeed, in the early unreported case of R v.
Sparkes, the court held that evidence of a defendant’s confession to a protestant
minister was admissible.58 This view was further echoed in dicta by the court’s
nineteenth century decisions of Wheeler v. Le Marchant and Anderson v. Bank of
British Columbia.59 Notwithstanding this general view, the court in R v. Griffin drew
an analogy between the attorney-client privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege in
asserting that evidence of spiritual communications ought not to be given. However,
it noted that its view was not grounded in any rule of law.60 To the extent it was still
recognized by courts, English statutes passed to limit the practice of the Catholic

51
See Caroline Incledon, Note, The Constitutionality of Broadening Clergy Penitent Privilege Statutes, 53
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 537, 539 (2016).
52
Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 REGENT U.
L. REV. 145, 146 (2000).
53
Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 649.
54
See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 49.
55
See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 589–91
(John Bowring ed., 1843).
56
JEREMY BENTHAM, Exclusion Continued––Causes for Which It Is Proper or Not, According to
Circumstances, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 169 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
57
Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
58
Anthony Gray, Is the Seal of the Confessional Protected by Constitutional or Common Law?, 44
MONASH U. L. REV. 112, 122 (2018).
59
Id. at 123 n.58 (first citing Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, 68; then citing Anderson v.
Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644, 651).
60
Id. at 123.

Journal of Legislation

163

religion effectively abrogated its presence in England.61 Nevertheless, given its
support in early English courts and in some cases following the reformation, it is
unsurprising that the privilege later emerged in the common law jurisdictions of the
United States and Australia.
C. HISTORICAL TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the earliest-known common law recognition of the
clergy-penitent privilege is the 1813 case of People v. Phillips.62 In that case, the
New York Court of General Sessions held that a Catholic priest could not be
compelled to testify regarding penitential communications made during a sacramental
confession by a suspected thief.63 The court recognized that “[t]he sacraments of a
religion are its most important elements.”64 Thus, the court stated that to compel a
priest to testify as to the contents of confidential penitential communications would
constitute an infringement upon his right to exercise his religion freely because
“[s]ecrecy is of the essence of penance . . . [and] [t]o decide that the minister shall
promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare that there shall be no penance;
and this important branch of Roman [C]atholic religion would be thus annihilated.”65
Shortly after the Phillips decision, the privilege was limited by another New
York decision in People v. Smith.66 There, the court distinguished sacramental
confessions made to a Catholic priest, as required by the canon law of the Catholic
Church, and communications with a Protestant minister that were not formally
required by the religion but served as a form of spiritual guidance.67 The court
suggested that whether the privilege was available turned not on the nature of the
communication but instead on whether the secrecy of such communications was
mandated by the religion in question.68 A year later, the rationale underlying the
decision in People v. Smith was echoed in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts when it decided Commonwealth v. Drake.69 In that case, the court
emphasized that a confession made to a Baptist minister was not “required by any
known ecclesiastical rule” and “without any requisition, or even solicitation,” it could
not inure the benefit of the clergy-penitent privilege.70
Despite the prevalence of this interpretation, the New York legislature
abrogated the People v. Smith decision in 1828 and passed the first-ever clergypenitent privilege statute in America, which effectively extended the privilege to other
61

Richard Nolan, The Law of the Seal of Confession, 13 CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA (1912).
People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reproduced in Privileged Communications to Clergymen,
1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
2 Rogers’ N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817), reproduced in Privileged
Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955).
67
Id.
68
Radel II & Labbe, supra note 14.
69
See Jude O. Ezeanokwasa, The Priest-Penitent Privilege Revisited: A Reply to the Statutes of Abrogation,
9 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 58–59 (2014) (discussing Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161
(1818)).
70
Drake, 15 Mass. at 162.
62
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religious denominations. The New York statute stated that, “[n]o minister of the
gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any
confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination.”71 This statute greatly
influenced the legislative development of the clergy-penitent privilege in America.72
By 1904, twenty-five states had followed suit in statutorily adopting their own forms
of the privilege, and by 1963, another nineteen states codified it.73 By 1991, every
state in the union and the District of Columbia had a clergy-penitent privilege
statute.74
The most notable federal legislative effort was Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 506, which the Supreme Court Advisory Committee adopted in 1972.75
Notably, the proposed rule adopted an expansive view of “clergyman” such that the
privilege would cover any “individual reasonably believed” to be acting as a
“functionary of a religious organization.”76 Although Congress did not expressly
adopt the proposed rule, it did not foreclose its use on a case-by-case basis.77
Therefore, many federal courts have used the proposed and rejected Rule 506 as a
reference point in dealing with cases involving the clergy-penitent privilege.78
Indeed, it has been said that, “[t]he inclusion of the [clergy-penitent privilege] in the
proposed rules, taken together with its uncontroversial nature, strongly suggests that
the privilege is, in the words of the Supreme Court ‘indelibly ensconced’ in the
American common law.”79
71
Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57 (1963) (citing REV.
STAT. OF N.Y. tit. 3, § 72 (1829)).
72
Id.
73
26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 26 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
5612 (1992); see also Mazza, supra note 6, at 182.
74
Ezeanokwasa, supra note 69, at 60.
75
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973). The Communications to Clergymen stated:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting
him.
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not intended for further
disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication
(b) General Rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a
clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his
guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The
clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His authority to do so is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Id.
76
Id.
77
The report by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concerning the proposed rules stated:
It should be clearly understood that . . . the action of Congress [in accepting Rule 501 and
rejecting the other proposed rules] should not be understood as disapproving any
recognition of . . . any . . . of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court
rules. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 7051, 7059.
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The first reported federal case recognizing the clergy-penitent privilege by
operation of the common law was the 1958 case of Mullen v. United States.80 In
concurrence, Judge Fahy opined that there was a common law basis upon which
“reason and experience” would permit the court to find that the clergy-penitent
privilege applied in a case regarding spiritual counseling offered by a minister.81
After the Mullen case, the clergy-penitent privilege was again implicitly recognized
in United States v. Wells.82 Citing Mullen, the court recognized that confidential
penitential communications were protected by the clergy-penitent privilege at
common law and thus, because a letter contained “no hint that its contents were to be
kept secret, or that its purpose was to obtain religious or other counsel, advice, solace,
absolution or ministration,” it was admissible.83 The Supreme Court has effectively
ratified the clergy-penitent privilege in dicta repeatedly throughout the last century as
well. In United States v. Nixon, the Court noted that, “an attorney or a priest may not
be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.”84
Similarly, in Trammel v. United States,85 the Court stated that, “the [clergy-penitent
privilege] recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and
absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive
priestly consolation and guidance in return.”86
Other legal institutes and organizations have also recognized the privilege
throughout American history. In the early 1940s, the American Law Institute drafted
its Model Code of Evidence to include the clergy-penitent privilege.87 The privilege
was also included when the Uniform Rules of Evidence were originally published in
1953.88 This historical landscape evidences the reverence with which the privilege
has been viewed throughout American history. This reverence had been largely
maintained until the recent legislative efforts discussed infra Part II.A emerged.
D. HISTORICAL TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA
In Australia, case law has played less of a role in the development of the
clergy-penitent privilege than statutory efforts. Indeed, it has been widely argued that
there is no clergy-penitent privilege at common law recognized in Australia.89
Nevertheless, there have been comments in dicta lending support to its recognition.
In the 1940 case of McGuinness v Attorney-General, the Court stated that the
relationship between “priest and penitent” was among the few “where paramount
considerations of general policy appeared to require that there should be a special
80

Id. at 381–82; see also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Id. at 51.
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Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2003); see also MODEL CODE OF EVID. R.
219 (1942).
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81

166

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 47:2]

privilege.”90 Similarly, in Baker v Campbell, one justice said “[t]he need for
preservation of . . . priest-penitent confidentiality seems to be as strong as the need
for preservation of lawyer-client confidentiality in the area of advice.”91 While these
jurists denied the existence of a common law clergy-penitent privilege, they
recognized its privileged status as a largely statutory creature in Australia.
Indeed, from a statutory perspective, the twentieth century saw significant
legislative development when four Australian states, including New South Wales,92
the Northern Territory,93 Tasmania,94 and Victoria,95 joined the Commonwealth in
adopting legislation which provided for the clergy-penitent privilege. In 1972, the
Commonwealth Government expressed a desire for uniform evidence legislation
across Australia in the Evidence Bill 1972.96 However, Queensland and Western
Australia refrained from joining the movement towards uniform evidence
legislation.97 Instead, those states favored judicial discretion regarding penitential
communications, as recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 98
Although New South Wales did not expressly provide for a clergy-penitent privilege,
it did provide for a professional communications privilege, which could be used to
cover penitential communications.99
Of those states who historically provided for the clergy-penitent privilege,
each limited its scope to formal ritual confessions.100 However, in R v. Lynch, Justice
Crisp suggested that the statutory scope of the privilege could be viewed more
expansively as protecting not only ritual confessions but also confidential
communications concerning other forms of spiritual counseling.101 Each of the acts
extended the privilege to “clergy of any church or religious denomination.”102 While
90
A. Keith Thompson, Religious Confession Privilege at Common Law: A Historical Analysis, MURDOCH
UNIV. 267 (2006) (quoting McGuiness v. Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73).
91
Id. at 271 (quoting Baker v. Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 75).
92
See Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 127(1). “A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church
or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents
of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy.” Id. “In this section: religious
confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional
capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned.” Id. at 127(4).
93
See Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 12(1) (stating that clergymen of any church or religious denomination
shall not divulge any confessions made to them as a professional in any proceeding without the consent of the
person who made the confession).
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See Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) s 96(1) (“No clergyman of any church or religious denomination shall
divulge in any proceeding any confession made to him in his professional character, except with the consent of
the person who made such confession.”).
95
See Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 28. The Victoria statute read:
No clergyman of any church or religious denomination shall without the consent of the
person making the confession divulge in any suit action or proceeding whether civil or
criminal any confession made to him in his professional character according to the usage
of the church or religious denomination to which he belongs.
Id.
96
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Communications Given in Religious Confessions?, 4 MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J. L. 3 (1997).
97
Van Esch & Van Esch, supra note 89, at 91.
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these statutes took a broad view of clergy as well as the types of communications
covered, they did attempt to at least minimally narrow the scope of the privilege by
making it available only where clergy were acting in their “professional character.”103
Within this framework, the Queensland Law Reform Commission posited that
penitential communications in the context of a sacramental confession in the Catholic
Church were certainly privileged by those statutes.104
While these acts shared important similarities, they differed regarding
whether the priest or penitent could assert the privilege.105 First, New South Wales
allowed the privilege to be claimed by any individual who fell within the statutory
definition of clergy, whether past or present.106 Meanwhile, the other jurisdictions
limited the privilege to those who were currently acting as clergy.107 Second, the
Evidence Acts of the Northern Territory and Victoria accorded the privilege to the
penitent.108 In contrast, the privilege belonged to the clergy under the Evidence Acts
of New South Wales, Tasmania, and the Commonwealth.109 These legislative
developments further exemplify the longstanding international recognition that an
evidentiary privilege for clergy-penitent communications is an appropriate
mechanism for respecting individual religious exercise. Like the United States,
however, recent legislative efforts in Australia discussed infra Part II.B have largely
departed from this recognition. For this reason, it is necessary to consider how the
United States and Australia approach religious freedom generally, and whether such
a departure is consonant with that constitutional pillar.
E.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTIONS

i.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Its
Jurisprudence

In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution was adopted
to curtail legislative power “to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to
worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own
conscience.”110 The Free Exercise Clause111 limits the ability of the government to
curb religious beliefs and practices. Equally important in crafting proper legislation,
the Establishment Clause112 prohibits the government from passing legislation which
favors religious belief over non-belief,113 or gives preference to one denomination
103
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105
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Id. at 55.
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over another.114 Under the doctrine of incorporation, the states are similarly bound
to uphold these guarantees via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.115 It is largely undisputed that legislation which protects or abrogates
the clergy-penitent privilege implicates each of these clauses.116 With respect to the
Free Exercise Clause, it is generally agreed that religious belief is unequivocally
protected, while religious actions may be subject to further confirmation as challenges
arise.117
Early United States Supreme Court cases addressing the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment held that religious belief did not excuse practices
which violated the criminal law.118 Over time, however, persons were afforded
religious belief protection from generally applicable laws.119 While the Court has
stated that the government may not “force anyone to . . . say or believe anything in
conflict with his religious tenets,”120 it has permitted some interference. In Sherbert
v. Verner,121 the Supreme Court stated that the state must demonstrate a “compelling
interest” to justify a law which substantially infringes on religious exercise.122 If such
a compelling interest is proven, then the legislation must also be “narrowly tailored”
to achieve that objective and constitute the “least restrictive means” of doing so.123
This strict scrutiny analysis serves to ensure the protection of the fundamental right
to freely exercise one’s religion.
In Sherbert, the Court held that the state had not demonstrated a compelling
state interest to justify the denial of unemployment benefits to a person who was
unavailable to work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs.124 Similarly, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,125 the Court held that the state’s interest in compelling Amish
children to attend school beyond the eighth grade was outweighed by the right of
parents to freely exercise their religion.126 In that case, the Court noted that the state’s
interest was still served in the absence of that mandate and if it were to be enforced,
it could have significant consequences for the longstanding Amish religious practice
and way of life.127
In 1990, the Supreme Court’s standard for evaluating free exercise cases
shifted with its decision in Employment Division v. Smith.128 There, the Court stated
that a law which burdens religious exercise is permissible under the Free Exercise
114
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Clause when it is neutral and generally applicable.129 Therefore, the Court said that,
“if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of [the law] but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended.”130 For that reason, the Court held that members
of a Native American church who challenged a law prohibiting the use of peyote were
not entitled to an exemption on the basis of its use in religious ceremonies.131
However, if it can be shown that the law is not neutral and generally applicable, then
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.132
Of course, if a statute expressly targets religion, then it is invalid. However,
this is not necessary to find a violation. Even if a statute merely abrogates a
preexisting statutory exemption for religious practices, it may not be deemed neutral
and generally applicable. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal,133 the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempt to quell a
“longstanding exemption” from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of hoasca
in religious sacramental practices.134 The government asserted that permitting this
preexisting statutory exemption to go forward would “necessarily . . . undercut” the
effectiveness of the Controlled Substances Act if it was “not uniformly applied,
without regard to burdens on religious exercise.”135 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive and noted that the religious exemption “has been in place since the
outset of the Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has ‘undercut’
the Government’s ability to enforce the ban.”136 On this basis, the Court held that the
government was required to pass strict scrutiny and demonstrate a compelling interest
“by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would
seriously compromise its ability to” achieve its objectives in relation to the substantial
burden imposed on the sacramental ritual at issue.137
Even if a law is neutral and of general applicability, scholars have noted that
Smith itself provides for two exceptions which would justify the grant of a religious
exemption, thereby requiring strict scrutiny.138 First, Smith noted that per Sherbert,
Yoder, and their progeny, “where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’
without compelling reason.”139 Second, referencing Yoder and similar cases, the
Court recognized a hybrid-rights exception in which a Free Exercise claim, in
conjunction with another right, would warrant an exemption from an otherwise

129

Id.; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
131
Id. at 890.
132
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
133
546 U.S. 418 (2006).
134
Id. at 436.
135
Id. at 434 (quoting Brief for Petitioners 18).
136
Id. at 435.
137
Id.
138
Merlino, supra note 46, at 686–87.
139
Id. at 687; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
708 (1986)).
130

170

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 47:2]

neutral and generally applicable law.140 Therefore, “two distinct but related claims .
. . [may] . . . generate a hybrid” right requiring strict scrutiny.141
The hybrid-rights approach was recognized by the D.C. Circuit in EEOC v.
Catholic University of America.142 There, the court considered a claim by a Catholic
nun that she was denied academic tenure on the basis of her sex in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.143 The court rejected her claim, holding that a
religious institution is afforded the authority “to select its own ministers free of
government interference. . . .”144 In doing so, the court further recognized that there
is “a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches
to ‘decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine.’”145 Because enforcement of the civil rights
law would require government inquiry into the internal governance practices of a
religious institution, the court found that such entanglement would also implicate the
Establishment Clause, thereby creating a hybrid situation in which strict scrutiny
would be necessary.146
Importantly, scholars have recognized that this suggests both an individual
and institutional right to free exercise, and that a hybrid right may arise from the
Religion Clauses themselves.147 Most recently, the Supreme Court effectively
reiterated this institutional right to religious freedom in the 2012 case of HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.148 In that case, the Court
held that enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act against a church and
parochial school violated the Free Exercise Clause because it “interfere[d] with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over . . . its
beliefs.”149 Such enforcement would also implicate the Establishment Clause, “which
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions” as those
concerning the ministry of faith.150
In addition to the right of institutional autonomy, scholars have identified
another hybrid-rights exception concerning the interplay between the right to the free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech, specifically the negative right of the
individual not to speak.151 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,152 the
Supreme Court held that Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be compelled to salute the
American flag in public schools, as it was contrary to their sincerely held religious
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beliefs.153 Likewise, in Wooley v. Maynard,154 the Court ruled that motorists could
not be compelled to display license plates with the phrase “Live Free or Die” because
the state’s interest in that message was not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion
on the individual’s right not to speak in a way that conflicted with his sincerely held
beliefs.155
Yet another hybrid-rights exception may apply with respect to the right to
the free exercise of religion and the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, courts have recognized that “the constitutional right to privacy blankets the
attorney-client relationship.”156 Likewise, the right to privacy is the modern rationale
for the doctor-patient privilege.157 Insofar as the right to privacy undergirds the
attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges, it would be perplexing to not find such
an interplay in the clergy-penitent context. Indeed, scholars have argued that the
justifications for the clergy-penitent privilege are stronger than those for other
evidentiary privileges.158 Furthermore, some scholars have posited that “while the
clergy-penitent privilege may serve to protect free exercise of religion, it principally
serves to protect an individual’s right to privacy.”159 This combination may provide
another viable path through which to revive strict scrutiny in the context of the clergypenitent privilege.
Regarding the Establishment Clause, the government may not pass
legislation that has the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.160 In this light, the Establishment Clause protects both religious and
nonreligious individuals.161 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a
three-prong test for determining whether a government action violates the
Establishment Clause.162 “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion”; and third, the “statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”163
Although the Court has applied variations of this test since its inception, a
clear mandate with respect to its application does not yet exist.164 Instead, the Lemon
factors are recognized as “helpful signposts.”165 Nevertheless, the Court has
recognized that “[e]ach value judgment under the Religion Clauses must . . . turn on
whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious
153
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beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.”166 In the recent aforementioned
case of Hosanna-Tabor, the Court found a violation not only of the Free Exercise
Clause, but also of the Establishment Clause, on the basis that it “prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions” as those pertaining to who
will minister to the faithful and by what means.167 As discussed further infra Part
IV.B, this could have significant implications for drafting a constitutional clergypenitent privilege statute that shows adequate deference to the mandated secrecy of
penitential communications.

ii.

Section 116 of the Australian Constitution

Quite similarly, in Australia, Section 116 of its Constitution, which was
drafted based on the religion clauses of the United States’ First Amendment itself,168
provides for an Establishment Clause, Observance Clause, and Free Exercise
Clause.169 Notably, however, where the First Amendment has been incorporated onto
the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 116 of the Australian
Constitution regrettably applies only to the Federal Commonwealth.170 Therefore,
some say that Australian states are not expressly prohibited from infringing on
religious exercise, establishing a religion, imposing religious observance, or
exempting religious individuals from public service.171
Another notable distinction is that, where the free exercise of religion is an
affirmative right in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, Section 116
does not embody a freestanding right of the individual, but only a limitation against
the legislative power of the Commonwealth.172 Further issues arise from the fact that
while the First Amendment has been the subject of much litigation in the United
States, a dearth of Section 116 cases exists in the High Court of Australia (“Court”),
and it has never found a violation of that provision.173 In “the leading case” of
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth, the Court
considered a law which ordered property to be seized by the government in support
of a war effort. 174 The Court decided the case on other grounds but stated in dicta
that the “exercise” of religion was protected under Section 116, which included acts
in pursuit of religious beliefs.175

166

Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
168
CAROLYN EVANS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 5
(2009), https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/frb/papers/Legal_%20Aspects.pdf [hereinafter
EVANS I].
169
“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious
observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.” Australian Constitution s 116.
170
Bogen, supra note 118, at 54–57; EVANS I, supra note 168.
171
EVANS I, supra note 168, at 19.
172
CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE IN AUSTRALIA, NAT’L REPORT: AUS. (2010),
https://classic.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Australia.1.pdf [hereinafter EVANS II].
173
Bogen, supra note 118, at 58; see also Gray, supra note 21, at 21.
174
Gray, supra note 21, at 21 (citing Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v Cth (1943) 67 CLR 116
(Austl.)).
175
Id. (citing Adelaide Co., 67 CLR at 124).
167

Journal of Legislation

173

Today, the Australian High Court places particular emphasis on the purpose
of the law when considering free exercise claims.176 In turn, the High Court has
consistently held that a challenged law is valid under Section 116 unless its purpose
is to establish a religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof.177 Thus, the High Court
characteristically upholds neutral and generally applicable laws.178 In this light, the
High Court’s approach is similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith, as previously discussed in Part I.C. Indeed, in Kruger v
Commonwealth,179 a justice of the Australian High Court cited Smith for the
proposition that generally applicable laws are not subject to free exercise review and
will be upheld with little scrutiny unless their purpose is to infringe religious
freedom.180
Notwithstanding the centrality of purpose in Section 116 cases, there has
been disagreement in the High Court concerning how to determine whether
legislation has been enacted for a “forbidden purpose.”181 In Kruger, the Court
considered an ordinance which had aboriginal children removed from their homes.182
While the majority of justices did not discern a forbidden purpose, Justice Gaudron
argued that insofar as the law had the effect of preventing children from participating
in their religious practices, a forbidden purpose could be inferred unless the
government showed that it was necessary to achieve a compelling public interest
unrelated to religion.183 In this light, Justice Gaudron effectively demonstrated a
preference for a strict scrutiny approach similar to that of the Sherbert-Yoder line of
cases in the United States.
The purpose-centered analysis of the Australian High Court is still in flux,
and with little litigation on the subject, how the Court would address the issue going
forward remains unclear. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, as evidenced by the
Court’s use of Smith, the High Court strongly considers judicial developments in the
United States.184 Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court continues to develop
Smith and the hybrid-rights theory, the standard is likely to shift in Australia as well.

II.

MODERN STATUTORY TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES & AUSTRALIA:
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AND MANDATORY
REPORTER STATUTES
A. MODERN TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
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Today, courts in the United States generally recognize the legitimacy of the
clergy-penitent privilege. Indeed, there exists a paucity of cases denying the existence
of a common law clergy-penitent privilege in the United States.185 Although all fifty
states and the federal government have come to recognize the privilege, they have
done so on different grounds. As discussed supra Part I.C, the federal government
has done so by way of common law interpretation and reference to the proposed and
rejected Rule 506. In contrast, all fifty states have expressly passed statutes enacting
some form of the clergy-penitent privilege.186 However, these states differ in terms
of key statutory variables, including: (1) the definition of clergy; (2) the scope of the
communications protected; (3) who may assert the privilege; and of paramount
importance for purposes of this Note, (4) whether the privilege applies in cases of
child abuse where a cleric’s duty to report under a mandatory reporter statute conflicts
with his spiritual obligation as a sacramental mediator.
Regarding the definition of “clergy,” about half of states define the term as,
“a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a
religious denomination or religious organization.”187 Some states define clergy even
more broadly by including the proposed and rejected Rule 506 language also covering
any “individual reasonably believed” to be acting as such by the penitent.188 These
liberal definitions of clergy ensure that the privilege is not unduly limited to certain
religious groups, but they also arguably open the door to assertion of the privilege by
persons who rightly may not be regarded as clergy in the ordinary sense of the word.
In contrast, some states do not define the term clergy at all, but simply state the
privilege will apply to any “‘clergyman or priest[,]’” thereby providing virtually no
guidance on the privilege at all.189 Finally, the rest of the states have adopted a more
restrictive approach, limiting the privilege to clergy of “‘bona fide established
185
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(1) “Cleric” means a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a
religious organization or an individual reasonably believed to be so by the
person consulting that individual.
(2) “Confidential Communication” means a communication:
(A) made privately; and
(B) not intended for further disclosure except to other persons in
furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
(b) Statement of the Privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, any confidential communication:
(1) made to a cleric in the cleric’s religious capacity; and
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cleric’s office according to the usual course of practice or discipline.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by:
(1) the person who made the confidential communication;
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(3) the person’s personal representative if the person is deceased; and
(4) the person who was the cleric at the time of the communication and on
behalf of the communicant.
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church[es] or religious organization[s].’”190 Therefore, these states limit the privilege
to “bona fide clergy” in cognizable churches only. This ensures that the privilege is
not abused, but one may argue it is too limited insofar as there are colorable claims
to the privilege by little–known denominations. Until recently, Georgia had perhaps
the most restrictive definition of clergy, defining it as “any Protestant minister of the
Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, [or] any priest of the Greek Orthodox
faith.”191 Critics claimed this definition was unduly limited to the “major Western
religions.”192 Therefore, Georgia undertook in 2011 to revise its definition of the
privilege to include, among other things, the more expansive “similar functionary,”
verbiage included in other state definitions.193
In terms of the scope of the privilege, around half of U.S. states define it as
covering “‘any confidential communication made to [a cleric] in his professional
character.’”194 Importantly, this definition suggests that the communication need not
be penitential in nature, so long as the cleric is acting in his “professional” capacity.
Other states limit the privilege to “‘statement[s] made to [a cleric] under the sanctity
of the religious confessional’” or within the “‘course of discipline enjoined by [a
cleric’s] church.’”195 The effect of this restricted definition is to cover only those
formal penitential communications which are under a mandate of secrecy by the
religion in question, an approach which harkens back to the New York court’s
decision in People v. Smith.
With respect to who may assert the privilege, most states recognize the
penitent as the sole holder of the privilege.196 Only four states specifically permit
clergy to assert the privilege as well.197 However, if a penitent discloses the
communication to a third party, then the right to assert the privilege is vitiated.198 In
addition, some jurisdictions provide for waiver in certain circumstances. For
example, in Ohio, the penitent is the holder of the privilege, but he may waive the
privilege through his consent unless the penitential communication was made
“directly to the cleric” or “in the manner and context that places the cleric specifically
and strictly under a level of confidentiality that is considered inviolate by canon law
or church doctrine.”199
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In addition to the clergy-penitent privilege, every state has a mandatory
reporter statute aimed at discovering and stopping child abuse.200 However, states
differ in terms of the classes of individuals enumerated as mandatory reporters and
the scope of what must be reported.201 Today, over half of states have included
members of the clergy as professionals who are required by law to report known or
suspected child abuse and neglect.202 Of those states, twenty-four grant the privilege
for those penitential communications that fall within the statutory definition.203
Meanwhile, New Hampshire and West Virginia are the only states, along with the
territory of Guam, to deny the privilege in cases involving child abuse or neglect.204
Those two state statutes similarly provide, “[t]he privileged quality of communication
between husband and wife and any professional person [including a priest, minister,
or rabbi] and his patient or client, except that between attorney and client, shall not
apply to proceedings [regarding child abuse and neglect].”205 However, of those
states that do not expressly enumerate clergy as mandatory reporters but may
nonetheless include them under the “any person” statutory designation, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas also deny the privilege in cases
involving child abuse or neglect.206 Meanwhile, several states do not address the
clergy-penitent privilege in their mandatory reporter laws at all.207
The conflict between the clergy-penitent privilege and mandatory reporting
law was most recently addressed in the 2016 Louisiana Supreme Court case of
Mayeux v. Charlet.208 In that case, the parents of an alleged victim of sexual abuse
named a Catholic priest among several defendants, claiming that he failed to comply
with the state’s mandatory reporter statute after hearing of the alleged abuse during a
sacramental confession.209 The Louisiana statute at issue enumerates clergy as
mandatory reporters and defines the class as “any priest, rabbi, duly ordained clerical
deacon or minister, Christian Science practitioner, or other similarly situated
functionary of a religious organization . . . .”210 However, the statute preserved the
clergy-penitent privilege, stating that “[a] member of the clergy is not required to
report a confidential communication . . . [where] . . . under the discipline or tenets of
that church, denomination, or organization, [the cleric] has a duty to keep such
communications confidential.”211 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that although
clergy are mandatory reporters of child abuse, “a priest when administering the
sacrament of confession has no duty to report any confidential communications made
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during the confession that, by the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, he is
authorized to hear and is also duty bound to keep confidential.”212
At the legislative level, states have become more active in attempting to alter
judicial recognition of the clergy-penitent privilege in cases involving abuse. At
present, California, Utah, and North Dakota are among those states who grant the
privilege where the penitential communication falls within the statutory definition.213
However, legislators in each of those states have attempted to subordinate the
privilege in cases involving child abuse in recent years. Under existing law in
California, clergy are enumerated as mandatory reporters and must report known or
suspected instances of child abuse, except when the cleric acquires such knowledge
or suspicion in the context of a penitential communication.214 In February 2019, State
Senator Jerry Hill of California introduced S.B. 360 with the stated purpose of
eliminating the “exception for a penitential communication, thereby requiring clergy
to make a mandated report even if they acquired the knowledge or reasonable
suspicion of child abuse or neglect during a penitential communication.”215 The
effect of this bill would have been to abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege and thus
compel clergy to choose between following state law and violating their sincerely
held religious beliefs, or, in other words, following divine law and facing
imprisonment.
In May 2019, the California bill was amended, restating the purpose as intent
on further defining “a penitential communication for purposes of the exception. The
bill would also exempt from the exemption any penitential communication made
between a clergy member and another person employed at the same facility or
location as that clergy member, or between a clergy member and another clergy
member.”216 The effect of the bill as amended would still be to abrogate the privilege.
However, it would limit the breadth of that abrogation to penitential communications
between clergy and other religious institutional staff. This is but a modest amendment
that would nonetheless place clergy in a position wherein they would have to choose
between state law and their religious conscience. The effect of such language is that
clergy and employees of religious institutions do not share the same right to
confidential penitential communications as lay persons. Such a formulation arguably
implicates not only the Free Exercise Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause as well.
A similar effort arose in Utah where, in 2020, State Representative Angela
Romero introduced legislation intended to delete “provisions that exempt, under
certain circumstances, a member of the clergy from being required to report child
abuse and neglect.”217 Despite the fact that the statute already limited the privilege
to those clergy whose religions required confidentiality regarding penitential
communications, H.B. 90 sought to strike, in its entirety, language providing for a
clergy-penitent privilege exception in cases of child abuse or neglect discovered
during a sacramental confession. Most recently, in January 2021, several state
212
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senators and representatives in North Dakota introduced S.B. 2180, which would
similarly abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege in cases of child abuse and neglect.218
Currently, North Dakota law enumerates clergy as mandatory reporters but states that
they are “not required to report . . . if the knowledge or suspicion is derived from
information received in the capacity of spiritual adviser,” such as in the context of a
penitential communication in the confessional.219
Each of these legislative efforts stands to force clergy into the serious
dilemma of choosing between facing prosecution and even imprisonment for
violating the law or facing excommunication for violating a sincerely held religious
belief. Due to this grave implication for religious liberty, the California and North
Dakota efforts were withdrawn and placed on temporary holds, while the Utah bill
failed in the state house of representatives.220 In the wake of these legislative efforts,
sentiments of discontent have echoed among religious liberty advocates who have
said, “[i]n the United States, we expect to exercise our religion, including going to
confession and having spiritual counseling, without government invading our
privacy.”221
B. MODERN TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA
As discussed supra Part I.D, the clergy-penitent privilege has not received a
great deal of recognition in Australian courts. In the modern era, the issue has come
up sparingly. In 2008, the State Supreme Court of New South Wales considered a
claim by the Mormon Church that a legal obligation to reveal the contents of a
religious confession would violate Section 116 of the Australian Constitution.222 The
State Supreme Court held, with little reasoning offered, that the law was not an
unconstitutional infringement of the Free Exercise Clause.223
From a legislative perspective, while recent efforts to abrogate the clergypenitent privilege have met resistance in the United States, such efforts have been
successful in Australia. Despite the fact that the Australian Law Reform Commission
found an obligation to disclose evidence of confidential penitential communications
“to be against the spirit of [Section] 116,”224 the Royal Commission into Institutional
Responses to Child Sex Abuse recommended in its final report that the states’
mandatory reporting laws “should not exempt persons in religious ministry from
being required to report knowledge or suspicions formed, in whole or in part, on the

218
Mary Farrow, North Dakota Bill Would Force Priests to Violate Confessional Seal in Abuse Cases,
CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 13, 2021, 7:01 PM), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/north-dakota-billwould-force-priests-to-violate-confession-seal-in-abuse-cases-86118.
219
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-03 (West 2019).
220
See Farrow, supra note 218; McKenzie Stauffer, Bill to Require Clergy to Report Confessions of Child
Abuse Fails in House, KJZZ (Mar 16, 2020), https://kjzz.com/news/local/bill-to-require-clergy-to-report-childabuse-fails-in-house; North Dakota Lawmaker Withdraws Bill Requiring Violation of Seal of Confession, NAT’L
CATH. REG. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.ncregister.com/cna/north-dakota-lawmaker-withdraws-bill-requiringviolation-of-seal-of-confession.
221
Farrow, supra note 218.
222
EVANS I, supra note 168.
223
Id. at 22 n.27.
224
Austl. L. Reform Comm’n, Evidence (Report no. 38, 1987).

Journal of Legislation

179

basis of information disclosed in or in connection with a religious confession.”225 In
response to this report, several Australian states acted quickly to modify their
mandatory reporter laws and abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege in such cases.
Queensland,226 Victoria,227 Tasmania,228 South Australia,229 and the Australian
Capital Territory230 have passed legislation requiring priests to violate the seal of
confession or face imprisonment.
These legislative efforts have the effect of making clergy mandatory
reporters of child abuse and abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege.
Notwithstanding these threatened penalties, Catholic leadership in Australia has
denounced these legislative efforts, with Archbishop Peter Comensoli of the
Archdiocese of Melbourne saying he would rather go to jail than divulge the contents
of a sacramental confession.231 This sentiment reflects the concerning dichotomy
clergy face when legislatures abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege, namely,
complying with the laws of the government and violating the dictates of their religion,
or accepting prosecution for holding fast to their sincerely held religious beliefs.
Therefore, an analysis as to the propriety of such a dichotomy is necessary.

III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS IN THE
UNITED STATES & AUSTRALIA
A. IN THE UNITED STATES

Given that bills aimed at abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege have
recently been proposed in California, Utah, and North Dakota, it is necessary to
225
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evaluate whether the passage of such laws would run afoul of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting
the Religion Clauses, such legislation likely stands to violate the Constitution.
The first step under Smith is to decide whether the legislation in question may
properly be characterized as neutral and generally applicable. Under the Utah bill,
the exemption for clergy is stricken from the statutory language such that “[a]ny
individual who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse or
neglect . . . shall immediately report the alleged abuse or neglect . . . .”232 In a similar
way, the North Dakota bill eliminates the exemption for those spiritual
communications previously covered by the privilege. While this action may seem
neutral and generally applicable on its face, the Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro
makes clear that such governmental action demands strict scrutiny. In that case, the
Court emphasized the fact that there was a longstanding exemption for the use of
hoasca such that the government needed to demonstrate a compelling interest for how
maintaining the exemption stood to undercut the law in relation to the substantial
burden imposed on that sacramental exercise.233 Indeed, the statutory exemption had
existed for thirty–five years at the time of that case.234
Here, the statutory exemptions for clergy-penitent communications in
relation to the mandatory reporting laws of Utah and North Dakota have likewise
existed for roughly three decades.235 This fact, coupled with the historical reverence
with which the privilege has been viewed dating back centuries, suggests that these
laws are not neutral and generally applicable and thus require strict scrutiny review.
This is important because the government would then have to demonstrate how
maintaining this long–respected privilege would undercut its ability to apprehend and
prosecute suspected child abusers. Insofar as the enactment of these laws would
create an incentive structure that leads such abusers to simply avoid the confessional
altogether, it is unlikely that the government could meet its burden.
As introduced, the California bill was similar to the aforementioned
legislation.236 As amended, the California bill maintained the privilege for penitential
communications by the laity but not for penitential communications between the
clergy.237 Additionally, the scope of the privilege was defined to apply only to those
clergy “specifically and strictly under a level of confidentiality that is considered
inviolate by church doctrine.”238 On this basis, the law is not even facially religion–
neutral or individual neutral, and thus likely fails under the Religion Clauses as well.
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,239 the Court considered
whether an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifices was constitutional. It found that
the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” used in the ordinance at issue supported the
conclusion that the law was not religion neutral.240 Furthermore, it noted that the
232
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effect of the law was “strong evidence of its object,” which it determined was to
inhibit the practice of a particular religion, namely, Santeria.241
Here, the California bill is not facially neutral. Indeed, it makes an express
distinction between clergy who hold secrecy of confession “inviolate” and those that
do not. Additionally, it accords a right to secrecy of penitential communications made
by individual lay penitents but not those by clergy or other religious institutional
employees. For these reasons, it may be said that the law unduly targets certain
religions as well as clergy and religious institutions generally—the former being
targeted by virtue of the fact that it applies to religions who hold a seal “inviolate,”
and the latter being targeted as unentitled to the same protections afforded the laity.
The effect of such legislation would be to inhibit the practice of sacramental
confessions and thus likely run afoul of the First Amendment. Furthermore, as stated
previously, such a construction would likely raise Equal Protection issues under the
Fourteenth Amendment as well.
Even if the California bill were accepted as neutral and generally applicable,
the next step in the Smith analysis is to determine whether an exemption nonetheless
applies to invoke strict scrutiny. First, Smith recognized that legislation cannot extend
individualized exemptions not afforded in circumstances of “religious hardship”
without compelling justification.242 The California bill does exactly this by
exempting the penitential communications or confessions of the laity at the exclusion
of those by clergy and religious institutional staff. Indeed, it is perhaps unfathomable
to imagine a “religious hardship” more significant than facing immediate
excommunication from one’s church. The implication of the statutory language is
that the legislature does not have an interest in curbing abuse generally, but rather, in
apprehending suspect clergy specifically. Furthermore, given that the bill targets
faiths that hold the seal of confession inviolate, it may be said that the interest is even
more narrowly aimed at the Catholic Church and other churches whose clergy have
been in the news regarding child abuse. Such discriminatory treatment “tends to
exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion,” thereby making strict scrutiny
proper.243
Aside from these individual concerns, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Catholic University and the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the Religion Clauses
in Hosanna-Tabor represent a shift towards an emphasis on the ability of organized
religious institutions to govern their own internal affairs.244 Indeed, in HosannaTabor, the Court noted that Smith itself distinguished between legislation aimed at
“physical acts,” like the use of peyote in that case, and legislation “lend[ing] its power
to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”245
Therefore, the Court expressly stated that Smith would not apply in cases involving
“an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”246
241
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This means that “churches as institutions—wholly apart from the individual
believer—may still claim exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause from otherwise
generally applicable laws that encroach upon their autonomy, especially in matters of
doctrine and church administration.”247 Here, legislative efforts to abrogate the
clergy-penitent privilege very clearly encroach upon the doctrine embodied in the
sacrament of Penance by demanding that the Church unseal the confessional.
On this basis, even if these bills are neutral and generally applicable, to the
extent they inhibit the free exercise of both the individual and the Church as an
institution, the hybrid-rights theory of Smith applies.248 In this regard, legislative
efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege affect the individual’s right to freely
exercise his or her religion—whether lay or clergy—as well as the Church’s
institutional autonomy in determining how to govern penitential communications
generally without interference from the government. Indeed, in the Catholic context,
individual and institutional religious freedom are deeply intertwined. It has been said
that the seal of confession serves two purposes, the primary purpose being “protection
of the religion itself, with the privacy of the individual penitent secondary to this.”249
Moreover, the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that, in addition to
conferring God’s grace upon the penitent, the sacrament revitalizes the “life of the
Church which suffered from the sin of one of her members.”250 In this context, the
clergy-penitent privilege is properly viewed as a mechanism which protects not only
the free exercise of the individual penitent but also the institutional autonomy of the
Church itself to effectuate its “authority and duty, conferred and commanded by
Christ himself, to grant individual absolution. . . .”251 Therefore, laws like these,
whether neutral and generally applicable or not, implicate the dual interests of
individual religious freedom and church autonomy, thereby requiring strict scrutiny
review.
Likewise, the hybrid-rights exception for free speech and free exercise also
likely applies. The Court’s decisions in Barnette and Wooley show that compelled
speech which contradicts one’s sincerely held beliefs may be subject to strict scrutiny
review. In Barnette, the Court stated that “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we
are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak
his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in
his mind.”252 In his concurrence, Justice Murphy stated that to compel one to speak
in a way that is contrary to one’s sincerely held religious beliefs is “the antithesis of
freedom of worship.”253 Insofar as these bills obligate clergy to reveal the contents
of sacred communications they are bound to hold secret under penalty of
excommunication, compelling them to testify to such information equates to
compelling them to not only speak against their faith but to abdicate it in its
entirety.254 Furthermore, to do so is to reject the theological and practical teachings
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of the Catholic faith. Recall that, in Catholic theology, the priest is deemed to have
“no mortal remembrance” of what is confessed because he stands in persona Christi
as a mediator of a conversation between only the penitent and God.255 It is for this
reason that, as a practical matter, seminarians are taught to treat a penitential
communication as though “it never happened.”256
Finally, a novel hybrid-rights exception may also be viable concerning the
relationship between the right to freely exercise religion and the right to privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a hybrid has not been expressly recognized in the
courts. However, its acceptance as the foundational right upon which the evidentiary
privileges of attorney-client and doctor-patient are based suggests that it may be
similarly supported in the clergy-penitent context. Insofar as the hybrid-rights
exception to Smith applies on one of the aforementioned bases, the constitutionality
of these bills returns to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Under Sherbert, Yoder, and their progeny, the Supreme Court has said that
the government must demonstrate a compelling interest that outweighs the substantial
burden imposed on religious exercise. In Yoder, the Court evaluated whether a law
that compelled all parents to cause their children to attend secondary school or pay a
fine violated the free exercise right of Amish parents.257 The Court said that “a State’s
interest . . . however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . .”258 Thus, “only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served” can overcome a
legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion.259 The Court held that although the
state’s interest in education was arguably a strong one, it could not overcome the right
of the defendants to freely exercise their religion.
In its analysis, the Court found that the law imposed a substantial burden on
religious practice, stating that a law does so when it “affirmatively compels
[someone], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of [his] religious beliefs.”260 Indeed, the Court said that “almost
300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of sustained faith pervading and
regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that . . . [the law] . . .
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [the Amish’s] religious
beliefs.”261 The Court also accorded great weight to the notion that the state’s interest
would still be served even if the Amish children did not attend school beyond the age
of sixteen because they were taught how to be self-reliant and equipped with technical
skills valuable to society.262
The same could be said of the issues posed by state efforts to subordinate the
clergy-penitent privilege to mandatory reporter statutes. First, it is evident that these
legislative efforts stand to impose a substantial burden on religious practice insofar
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as clerics would be subject to a dichotomous choice between following the dictates
of their religion or facing not just a mere fine but imprisonment for refusing to violate
the seal of confession. Furthermore, like the Amish, whose faith would be annihilated
in the face of the compulsory school attendance law, these bills stand to vitiate a
critical pillar of the Catholic faith—one of the seven sacraments of the Church. The
Yoder court perhaps prophetically drew a parallel between the interests of the Amish
and Catholics saying, “the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable from and
a part of the basic tenets of their religion . . . as much a part of their religious belief
and practices as . . . the confessional . . . for others.”263 Indeed, as discussed supra
Part I.A, the sacrament of Penance is an indispensable part of the Catholic faith with
its origin in the words of Jesus Christ himself, who said to his Apostles, “[i]f you
forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are
retained.”264
Although there is arguably a compelling state interest in obtaining evidence
that will further prosecutorial efforts against suspected child abusers, strict scrutiny
requires legislatures to demonstrate how removing the clergy-penitent privilege
would achieve the goal of curbing child abuse. This is a burden the government is
likely incapable of meeting because statutes that abrogate the clergy-penitent are
based upon a false premise, namely, that the privilege enables child abuse, and that
abrogation would diminish its prevalence.265 As scholars rightly point out,
knowledge and reason suggest that abrogation of the privilege will lead perpetrators
to simply avoid the confessional altogether, thus eliminating any chance of
rehabilitation or restoration that may be possible through a penitential
communication.266
In this light, it would be wrong to suggest that the government interest is not
otherwise served in the absence of legislation which abrogates the clergy-penitent
privilege. Indeed, maintaining the confidential nature of penitential communications
serves desirable social goals. Foremost among these goals, it provides a mechanism
through which individuals are encouraged to admit fault and seek forgiveness as well
as counsel concerning how to avoid such wrongdoing in the future.267 In this light, it
fosters reconciliation between the penitent, victim, and community as a whole. In the
Catholic context, this is achieved by the acts of penance which the penitent is directed
to complete to “expiate” his sins.268 As discussed supra Part I.A, this can take a
number of forms, but “[o]ne must do what is possible in order to repair the harm.”269
For example, one may be directed to “return stolen goods, restore the reputation of
someone slandered, [or] pay compensation for injuries.”270 Insofar as these directives
mirror many equitable and legal remedies, the privilege stands not only to further the
important social interest in freedom of religion, but also serves the state’s interest in
promoting justice and reconciliation with society.
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In sum, the recent legislative proposals of California, Utah, and North Dakota
violate the First Amendment by placing clergy in a position wherein they must choose
between violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or face criminal prosecution.
For these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that those bills have stalled or failed in
the face of steep opposition from not only religious communities, but indeed, those
legislators who are “committed to American political values.”271
B. IN AUSTRALIA
As discussed supra Part I.E.ii, legislative efforts to eradicate the clergypenitent privilege have been highly successful in Australian states and have not
received much attention from litigants. This is likely because the Australian states
are not bound by the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the High Court’s purposecentered approach has led it to consistently reject Section 116 claims.
Notwithstanding this pattern, legislation aimed at abrogating the clergy-penitent
privilege differs significantly from past Section 116 challenges. Therefore, if similar
legislation is adopted by the Commonwealth, then it may pose the first Section 116
violation. In Krygger v Williams,272 the High Court considered a Section 116
challenge in which the plaintiff argued that compulsory military service was
unconstitutional because it infringed upon his religious beliefs.273 In rejecting this
argument, Justice Griffith said, “[t]o require a man to do a thing which has nothing at
all to do with religion is not prohibiting him from a free exercise of religion.”274 The
implication is that legislation that compels an individual to breach the dictates of his
faith, as in the case of a priest compelled to violate the seal of confession, would
constitute a free exercise violation.275 Nevertheless, the purpose test poses a
significant obstacle.
In Kruger v Commonwealth, the High Court considered a Section 116
challenge to an ordinance that had children removed from their homes and placed
under the legal guardianship of the government. The plaintiffs argued that the forcible
removal of children from the aboriginal community effectively impaired the free
exercise of religion.276 Five justices held that the ordinance did not violate Section
116, in large part because a forbidden purpose could not be discerned from the
language of the ordinance.277 Indeed, the ordinance at issue in that case made no
mention whatsoever of religion or any other belief systems at all.278 Thus, it may
legitimately be said that there was only an incidental effect on religion. However, the
same is not true in the context of some Australian statutes which have abrogated the
clergy-penitent privilege. For example, in the Children Legislation Amendment Act
2019, the Parliament of Victoria expressly stated that its “main purposes” were to
“include persons in religious ministry as mandatory reporters . . . and . . . to clarify
271
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that a [cleric] is not able to rely on the religious confession privilege . . . to avoid the
reporting requirement.”279 In this light, the legislative purpose very clearly targets
the free exercise of religion on its face insofar as Australian legislatures are cognizant
of the confessional seal. Therefore, such legislation is much more likely to be deemed
unconstitutional if passed by the Commonwealth.

IV.

PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE CLERGYPENITENT PRIVILEGE
A. WHY A UNIFORM APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE

The conflict between the clergy-penitent privilege and mandatory reporter
statutes has been reconciled in a multitude of ways at both the national and
international levels, resulting in disparate implications for clergy depending on the
jurisdiction within which they reside. Insofar as many religious denominations span
the globe and the clerical profession is among the most mobile,280 scholars have noted
that it seems appropriate––and perhaps necessary––to implement a more uniform
approach to the privilege. In the Catholic Church alone, there are more than 400,000
clergy worldwide along with a population of more than 1.3 billion believers.281 The
various approaches to the privilege foster a lack of clarity among the clergy regarding
an already complicated subject matter, while also raising the potential for conflict of
law issues where a cleric has been transferred from one jurisdiction to another.282
While legislatures are sure to differ on particular details concerning the appropriate
drafting of the privilege, the current state of the law suggests that legislatures have
failed to strike a balance between these competing interests in favor of religious
liberty on the one hand or effective criminal prosecution on the other. To adequately
balance these issues, careful consideration of who may assert the privilege and the
extent to which it is available is paramount.
B. DEFINING CLERGY & LIMITING WHO MAY ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE
In attempting to draft a uniform statutory formulation of the clergy-penitent
privilege, it is necessary to decide who will be able to assert it. As discussed supra
Part II.A, statutory definitions of clergy vary significantly. Some jurisdictions have
defined clergy broadly, seeking to craft a less formalistic and more inclusive
definition that is not unduly limited to Western religions nor particular religious
actors. Others have opted for a more restrictive definition in which formalistic,
contextual considerations play a much greater role. Likewise, states vary in terms of
whether the privilege is held by the cleric, penitent, or both. Of course, the balance
which must be struck is between unduly limiting the privilege to the benefit of
particular religions and individuals on the one hand, versus leaving the door open to
potential abuse by laypersons and inapposite religions on the other.
279
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To best account for the free exercise interests at stake, the clergy-penitent
privilege should afford protection to both clergyman and penitent alike. Some
scholars have argued that the privilege should be held by the penitent only.283
Specifically, it is argued that the public policy which underlies the clergy-penitent
privilege is not materially different from that of other evidentiary privileges such as
the attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges, namely, to protect and foster open
communication by the client, patient, or penitent.284 This argument neglects the
fundamental interest at stake for the cleric that is wanting for attorneys and doctors,
namely, the cleric’s ability to freely exercise his religion in a manner equally worthy
of protection as that of the penitent. In this light, the clergy-penitent privilege is more
akin to the spousal privilege, which generally affords the ability to exercise and waive
the privilege to both spouses due to the recognition that both parties will generally
have a vested interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their communications.285
As discussed supra Part I.A, the clergy-penitent privilege was born out of
early church teaching concerning the mandated secrecy of penitential
communications which is today codified in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church.
Insofar as clergy are subject to excommunication for violating the seal of confession,
their fundamental religious liberty interest in keeping the contents of penitential
communications from judicial revelation is manifest. To require a cleric to divulge
the contents of such communications is to inhibit his ability to freely exercise his
religious belief, pitting his sincerely held religious beliefs against the state’s law.
Therefore, both the cleric and penitent should hold the privilege. This encourages
open and honest communication by the penitent and fosters trust in the confidentiality
of those communications, while also recognizing the cleric’s concurrent and
independent obligation to refrain from divulging the contents of penitential
communications.
Concerning the availability of the privilege among the clergy, due
consideration must be given to the fact that under the Establishment Clause,
preferential treatment may not be given to particular religions or to religion over nonreligion. It has been posited that restrictive definitions which extend the privilege
only to certain “recognized,” “bona fide,” or “regularly established” religions could
constitute preferential treatment for the most widely practiced Western religious
traditions, with Christian denominations foremost among them.286 Likewise, it has
been said that statutes that protect only those religions that mandate secrecy of
penitential communications or delineate particular religious actors such as a “priest,
rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a clergyman or ordained minister
of an established church” may run afoul of the Establishment Clause.287 The
argument is that such a definition unduly favors Catholicism and other faith traditions
whose clergy are bound by the seal of confession.288
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Interestingly, this argument implicitly recognizes a critical aspect of the
equally important and perhaps more apt free exercise considerations at play. These
considerations are applicable only to those faiths that the privilege is intended to
protect, namely, those with a sincerely held religious belief in the mandated secrecy
of penitential communications. It would be inconsistent with the history and purpose
of the privilege to insert such a belief into the exercise of other religious traditions.
Insofar as other religious denominations do not recognize confidential penitential
communications as an element of their faith, deprivation of the privilege does not
constitute preferential treatment of one religion over another but is instead a
recognition of the realities concerning a belief and practice that is not relevant to all
religions. Indeed, courts have recognized that consideration of a religious
“organization’s ecclesiastical rules, customs and laws . . . avoid[s] denominational
favoritism and is consistent with the aims of the clergy-penitent privilege.”289
Any definition of the clergy-penitent privilege must account for these
historical and theological realities, namely, that the mandated secrecy of the
confessional undergirds the existence of the privilege itself. Therefore, a definition
that extends the privilege to a mere “spiritual adviser” or any “individual reasonably
believed” to be acting as such unduly broadens the privilege in a manner that renders
it open to abuse by persons whose religion does not hold a sincere belief in the secrecy
of penitential communications. In fact, scholars have argued that a failure to limit the
privilege in this way elevates religion over non-religion by enabling actors whose
religions lack a mandate of secrecy to benefit from the privilege in a manner
unavailable to secular individuals, notwithstanding the fact that each would lack a
legitimate basis upon which to assert its necessity.290 Therefore, a proper definition
of clergy will restrict its availability to those individuals who are bound by the dictates
of their religion to hold penitential communications in confidence. Furthermore, the
privilege should be made available only to bona fide clergy. While some scholars
have argued that this is unduly restrictive, this limitation furthers the well-settled
notion that evidentiary privileges are to be drafted and construed “no more broadly
than necessary to accomplish their basic purposes.”291
In addition to the goal of fostering open and honest communication between
penitents and clergy, some of the basic purposes that have been recognized
concerning the clergy-penitent privilege include promoting or preventing the
government from inhibiting the free exercise of one’s religion, individual
communication with one’s God, the right to privacy, and the therapeutic value
associated with confessional activities.292 Concerning this last purpose, English jurist
and utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, said that although there are some
situations in which it would be beneficial to gain access to the contents of these
confidential penitential communications, “there are others in which the disclosures
thus made are actually of use to justice, under the assurance of their never reaching
the ears of the judge. Repentance and consequent abstinence from further misdeeds
289
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of the like nature” are among those benefits which flow from confidential penitential
communications.293 Insofar as the law recognizes these policy goals as valuable, it is
critical that the privilege be drafted in such a way as to effectuate these changes. Just
as it may be said that extension of the privilege to laypersons such as friends, family,
or coworkers would run afoul of these policy goals, so too may it be said of a
formulation which extends the privilege to any “individual reasonably believed” to
be acting as a religious functionary.
C. DEFINING THE SCOPE: BALANCING STATE INTERESTS IN CHILD ABUSE AGAINST
LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
Having established who may assert the privilege, it is necessary to determine
the bounds within which the privilege will be available. Clearly, a legitimate
expectation of confidentiality is a requisite condition for recognition of any
testimonial privilege.294 Beyond this, however, jurisdictions again differ significantly
in terms of where they draw the line concerning the scope of the privilege. Many
statutes extend the privilege to “any confidential communication” made to a member
of the clergy in his “professional character.”295 The problem with this formulation is
that it once again neglects the historical and theological context in which the clergypenitent privilege was adopted, namely, to protect those communications for which
there is a mandate of secrecy incumbent upon the cleric. Such a formulation again
expands the reach of the privilege in a way that opens the door to its abuse.
To limit and preserve the privilege as well as the purposes which underlie it,
its scope should not extend beyond those communications which a bona fide
clergyman is enjoined from disclosing under the discipline of his church. This
approach comports with other evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-client and
doctor-patient privileges insofar as they are backed by an objective, professional
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of particular communications.296 In the
absence of a specific religious dictate to maintain the secrecy of communications, the
rationale for a professional obligation of clergy to keep the contents of such
communications secret is wanting. This again raises an Establishment Clause concern
insofar as extension of the privilege to religions who lack a sincere belief in the
necessity for confidential penitential communications may be viewed as elevation of
religion over non-religion where both are bereft of any objective basis upon which to
assert the necessity of the privilege.297 For the same reason, the privilege should not
extend beyond religiously motivated communications such as penitential
communications.
Scholars have rightly pointed out that statutes which include language
protecting “any confidential communication” received by clergy in their
“professional capacity” provide little guidance as to what that includes, or perhaps
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more importantly for abuse prevention, what it does not include.298 Individuals may
seek and clergy may provide counsel in numerous ways, both secular and religious.
In its comments to the Children’s Code Article 603, the Louisiana legislature
explained that it limited the scope of the privilege to only those circumstances in
which a cleric is acting exclusively in his spiritual counseling capacity, under a duty
to keep such “sacrosanct and nondisclosable” communications confidential, to
prevent it from being abused where he was acting in a merely administrative,
supervisory, or secular counseling capacity.299 Indeed, where a cleric is acting in one
of these latter capacities, the necessity for the clergy-penitent privilege is wanting.
Therefore, a proper formulation of the privilege should emphasize the type of
communication the individual is engaging in with his or her cleric. In this regard,
only those penitential communications in which the penitent seeks religious or
spiritual guidance should be privileged.
Importantly, this does not speak to the gravity of the wrongdoing in question,
but rather, the purpose for which the communication is made. For example, it has
been held that the mere fact of an individual telling a clergy member he intends to
commit a criminal act will not inure protection under the clergy-penitent privilege
where the statement is not made for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance.300
Therefore, a proper definition would give protection to those penitential
communications made to a cleric for the purpose of obtaining religious or spiritual
guidance according to the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he
belongs. This ensures that the privilege is rightly limited to those religions which
mandate the secrecy of such communications and prevents it from being applied
beyond those narrow circumstances for which the privilege was adopted.
Concerning the relationship between the privilege and mandatory reporter
statutes, the seal of confession must remain of paramount importance. A plethora of
various arguments have been put forth, ranging from unsealing the confessional in its
entirety to strictly maintaining the confidentiality of such penitential communications,
irrespective of the contents in question. The latter approach is the only one that can
truly account for the right to freely exercise one’s religion in the penitential
communication context. Some scholars have argued for a “partial abrogation”
approach, in which clergy would be required to meet their obligation to report, but
that the reported information could not be used in a court of law against an alleged
perpetrator absent a source independent of the otherwise-privileged clergy-penitent
communication.301
While this approach attempts to strike a balance between the competing
interests at stake, it nevertheless fails to adequately account for the free exercise
considerations at play for the individual as well as the Church as an institution. In the
Catholic Church, the seal of confession “admits of no exceptions.”302 Indeed, the
canon law states that a priest must preserve the seal “even when all danger of
disclosure is excluded.”303 For these reasons, the conflict between the clergy-penitent
298
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privilege and mandatory reporter statutes should be drawn to protect the integrity of
the privilege. Insofar as the religious liberty interests are legitimate and the
preservation of the confessional seal is indispensable to protecting those interests, a
statute that subordinates the privilege would run afoul of the internationally
recognized human right to freely exercise religion.
CONCLUSION
The increasing efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege are an alarming
affront to the internationally recognized right to the free exercise of religion. The seal
of confession upon which the privilege is based is a centuries-old pillar of Roman
Catholicism and other faith traditions that is held sacrosanct in belief and practice.
The scriptural basis for the sacrament, early church teaching, and centuries of ardent
support for the confidentiality of penitential communications from both the secular
and religious spheres evidences its indispensable nature. While legislatures in the
United States and Australia have attempted to abrogate the privilege, this Note has
demonstrated the significant likelihood that such enactments are unconstitutional in
both jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding the shift in First Amendment jurisprudence after Smith,
many avenues to resurrect strict scrutiny remain viable with respect to the hybridrights exception. Under such an analysis, it is likely that these legislative efforts
would not pass constitutional muster. This is due to the manifest religious liberty
implications at stake when a cleric is faced with a dichotomous choice between
excommunication or prosecution, as well as the practical limitations to achieving the
asserted governmental interests. Likewise, although the High Court of Australia has
never found a Section 116 violation, legislation expressly and purposely directed at
this religious belief and practice such as that of the State of Victoria could pave the
way for the first such violation if passed by the Commonwealth. Furthermore, insofar
as the Supreme Court continues to evaluate the hybrid-rights theory of Smith, the
Australian High Court may alter its approach as it is faced with new challenges.
This Note has echoed prior scholars and further provided a guiding
framework for drafting a uniform privilege that assuredly protects the sanctity of
confidential penitential communications while narrowing the universe of individuals
who may assert the privilege as well as the scope of the communications covered.
Commensurate with the history of the privilege and its underpinnings, the privilege
should be limited to bona fide clergy who are under a mandate of secrecy regarding
penitential communications. Furthermore, it should cover only those penitential
communications for which the penitent seeks religious or spiritual guidance from a
cleric acting in his professional capacity as enjoined by the discipline of his church.
This serves to limit the privilege to confidential penitential communications and
prevent individuals who lack a sincere belief in the necessity for such from asserting
it, while also giving due deference to its indispensability for those faiths who hold it
inviolate and would be thus substantially burdened without it.
While this Note argues against subordinating the privilege to mandatory
reporter statutes, there is clearly a manifest interest in preventing and prosecuting
child abuse. It is evident that the Church has failed in many regards, and institutional
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changes from the inside out are necessary to ensure that clergy are adequately trained
to counsel penitents regarding the means through which the ends of justice and mercy
may be best served. With properly drafted legislation and thorough institutional
reform, legislatures and churches alike can work in tandem to address child abuse and
protect legitimate religious practice.

